Merlin found at fault for Smiler accident

[Turbo]

holy crap

Train 2 was going FAST! I wouldn't play that video if you guys don't like seeing things like crashes. No gore or anything just very unnerving.

I'm interested in hearing a perspective from someone like Mikey with regards to how they ended up blaming upper management for it.

[Turbo]

"The employee was hired by somebody. THE MANAGERS ARE SADISTS LETS SUE THEM!"

Every "Let me speak to your manager" customer ever.

I had to get shocked again at the line saying "the crash equated to a family car of 1.5 tons having collided at about 90mph"... that reminds me of a nasty train explosion seen in RCT1 and 2.

Unspeakable moment...

[Coasterkidmwm]

tiepilot35 wrote:

I'm interested in hearing a perspective from someone like Mikey with regards to how they ended up blaming upper management for it.

None of the older Schwarzkopfs back in the day loaded down with 5 trains full of drunks or the modern Disney rides with 90 trains whizzing around at once have managed to do something this stupid. This is either a failure in:

1. Training. I recall being told to turn the ride off, take out the keys, and physically walk away from the controls if the power went out or anything like that and I wasn't even maintenance or anything valuable when I worked.

2. Safety Standards. Train counts are not a difficult concept, and Smiler among other rides have cameras around to help you see where the trains are for a reason. If train counts and other really basic concepts aren't being enforced, then it's an upper management problem. This accident is a blunder equivalent to manufacturing plants failing to use lock-out tags on heavy machinery, or an air traffic controller ignoring the radar and telling a plane to land on a runway he didn't bother to check.

3. Employee stupidity. Should have been recognized earlier, and there are always warning signs. Any manager worth his salt knows who shouldn't be doing what. Again, another upper management failure.

Kudos for Gerstlauer for making trains that survived a hit that large so well. Also, I'm honestly surprised alcohol or another substance wasn't a contributing factor.

[Turbo]

^This. So much this. I can't speak for Merlin training standards however if the fault lies there then yes it is indeed an Upper Management issue. That said I wouldn't be surprised if it was just one moron being a moron. Sometimes there aren't warning signs of real stupidity and that also has to be addressed. If this guy had a history of issues then that's one thing but it seems like this is a one shot deal from the information present.

[slosprint]

It's a breakdown in standards of communication and reset protocol. If someone adds a train to the ride the ride op needs to be made aware of the new train count. If the op is only expecting 4 trains he won't be looking for or counting a 5th. In addition I think after any hard reset the ride should be cycled at least once to verify everything is operating smoothly. If they had cycled it you would have just had an empty trains colliding and while it would've been closed for awhile nobody would have been injured.

[Dirk_Ermen]

Apparently Merlin is also at fault on operation the ride on too high windspeeds. The ride manual mentions it's only allowed to operate under 34mph windspeeds. If it does operate above, A train could stall like what happened now. Apparently the windspeed detectors weren't even turned on that day.

[Coasterkidmwm]

Hmmm 34mph wind restriction. That's not a high number but it's not unusually low. At least they didn't do anything like install a ride with an around 25mph wind limit on a beach in an area notorious for surprise weather like another company...

^fantasy island?

[Coasterkidmwm]

Nah Cedar Point. Windseeker doesn't take much to shut down from wind and it has the word "wind" in its name lol

[hyyyper]

Does the wind speed thing really matter in this case? Sure it increases the chance of a train stalling, but there are a lot of things that can cause stalls. Thing is, even when a stall happens, the system (if not overruled) will simply start stacking trains on blocks. While not ideal, its like infinity times better than what happened to the guests.

[mkingy]

hyyyper wrote:

Does the wind speed thing really matter in this case? Sure it increases the chance of a train stalling, but there are a lot of things that can cause stalls. Thing is, even when a stall happens, the system (if not overruled) will simply start stacking trains on blocks. While not ideal, its like infinity times better than what happened to the guests.

It all comes down to risk management though - If you can reduce the risk of the ride stalling you don't have to the rely on the backup safety systems (and therefore introduce the chance for human error). So from the perspective of the HSE Merlin had the opportunity and tools to mitigate the risk of the ride stalling but didn't. It would seem regardless of if the stall was actually caused by excessive wind speed or over-trimming of the ride (as Alton said happened) this counted against them in the court proceedings.

[hyyyper]

Seems wrong, the back-up systems should function should eliminate the human error, not introduce it. Of all the rides I've operated, the automatic system safely stops the ride if the operator does something unexpected (hit a wrong button, or no button when he/she should).
But yeah, I get what you're saying about it counting against them. If they refuse to follow that rule, who knows how many other rules they ignored.

[mkingy]

hyyyper wrote:

Seems wrong, the back-up systems should function should eliminate the human error, not introduce it. Of all the rides I've operated, the automatic system safely stops the ride if the operator does something unexpected (hit a wrong button, or no button when he/she should).

For me personally this is what shocked me the most. As an enthusiast I've always believed that it was really really hard to mess things up and get a train on the same block - that just blew my mind in terms on the main concept behind rollercoaster safety.

[hyyyper]

I didn't read the reports at all, but this is what I picked up from the comments of people who did, but I am not sure how much of this is true.
Apparently the ride was in override mode when the accident happened. Maintenance people were at the ride because a train had missed a sensor and stopped the entire ride. Operators were told to manually override the block because for some reason this particular train had had such issues throughout the day. Operator missed the override, so the ride stopped.
Some while the trains were being evacuated, they added the fifth train to the course. So, an empty train is dispatched, next one is loaded again with passengers. Empty train gets a roll-back, loaded train stops on block, operator sees only the stopped loaded train and overrides the block, allowing the loaded train to collide into the stalled empty one.

So yeah, tl;dr: Bad things happen when attractions are in manual mode with guests riding.

[Coasterkidmwm]

hyyyper wrote:

Does the wind speed thing really matter in this case? Sure it increases the chance of a train stalling, but there are a lot of things that can cause stalls. Thing is, even when a stall happens, the system (if not overruled) will simply start stacking trains on blocks. While not ideal, its like infinity times better than what happened to the guests.

I was pretty surprised when I learned that Raptor at CP is very valley-prone if the wind direction is just right, and that's a frigging B&M.

[Turbo]

hyyyper wrote:

... Operators were told to manually override the block because for some reason this particular train had had such issues throughout the day...

There it is

You would think it would be totally not allowed, even against the law, to put a ride into override, with people on the ride.

[slosprint]

Austin wrote:

You would think it would be totally not allowed, even against the law, to put a ride into override, with people on the ride.

I'm pretty sure it is, which is why Merlin is losing the lawsuit.

[Turbo]

Is it? I actually have no clue. It should absolutely be illegal if it isn't. Having an override like that with passengers on the train is a dangerous risk even in the best case scenario.

No it isn't illegal. Do you really think that there are laws on the books for every little niche industrial process?

[Mikey]

tiepilot35 wrote:

I'm interested in hearing a perspective from someone like Mikey with regards to how they ended up blaming upper management for it.

You are always responsible for the people that report to you directly, or indirectly. That's why as you climb the corporate ladder the pay increases, because the liability does too.

When I was a team lead I was responsible for my ride, the guests, and it's crew. After I became an area supervisor I was responsible for two dozen rides, their guests, and their crews. As an department manager I was responsible for the supervisors, all the rides in the park, all the the guests and all their crews plus working with the maintenance departments on all the things required to keep things running. Getting the department director title meant I had all of that to keep track of, plus all the budgeting, schedules, working with the GM on service strategy etc.

You can see how quickly it goes from being in control of yourself and your immediate surroundings, to having make a decision to put the right butts in the right seats and trust that they will follow their training and do the right things should the time come. The front line needs to be proactive because the support (management) line is mainly a reactive entity. However you are asking a lot from a bunch of 16 year olds to be proactive... which is why you always make sure every crew has someone that is not a complete moron. Company culture plays a pretty big factor in the way people do things too. Organized versus disorganized training programs. etc

This accident happened because people did not understand the limitations of the automation running the ride. Failed to properly investigate the block trouble light by assuming it was false and subsequently overrode it on those unfounded assumptions. There is no faster way to get into trouble then to let unfamiliar/untrained people operate a loaded ride in manual or from the diagnostic console in the computer room. Secondly I am surprised smiler did not have a Safety PLC setup to monitor the primary. A safety PLC is designed to double check the primary and intervene with a power disconnect when it sees things go into a logic failure. Time based block checks with a safety PLC would have prevented this accident unless they foolishly reset both PLCs.

There is nothing illegal about operating in manual mode or from the diagnostic console. In fact in some cases it's the only way to put things back into a home position to restart in auto. You ever get a B & M stuck in the window between the station and the lift? You can't unload it because the train isn't fully engaged on the lift. Ya, the only way to clear that is in manual and to jog the lift and the station feed motors until the train is fully on lift passed the block PX switches. Stop the lift, clear the trouble light for the block advancement, back to auto and restart the lift. However with great power comes great responsibility and duty of care to insure that safety is not compromised. If you are not 100% what you are doing, you stop and ask someone who does know.

i recently found this video of the California Screamin' on You Tube. (spoiler) a train gets stuck on the crest of one of the hills, but when they reset it the train rolls back slightly, which probably wasn't supposed happen, but they stopped it before it rolled back completely (skip to 2:25 for that bit).
(plus, the staff in the video are amazing)

[Turbo]

Staff interaction is perfect haha

That makes perfect sense Mikey!